“But whether the Constitution really be one thing, or another, this much is certain - that it has either authorized such a government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In either case, it is unfit to exist.”
But when they refuse
any longer to pay for being thus cheated, plundered, enslaved, and
murdered, they will cease to have cheats, and usurpers, and robbers, and
murderers and blood-money loan-mongers for masters.
APPENDIX.
Inasmuch as the Constitution was never signed, nor agreed to, by
anybody, as a contract, and therefore never bound anybody, and is now
binding upon nobody; and is, moreover, such an one as no people can ever
hereafter be expected to consent to, except as they may be forced to do
so at the point of the bayonet, it is perhaps of no importance what its
true legal meaning, as a contract, is. Nevertheless, the writer thinks
it proper to say that, in his opinion, the Constitution is no such
instrument as it has generally been assumed to be; but that by false
interpretations, and naked usurpations, the government has been made in
practice a very widely, and almost wholly, different thing from what the
Constitution itself purports to authorize. He has heretofore written
much, and could write much more, to prove that such is the truth. But
whether the Constitution really be one thing, or another, this much is
certain--that it has either authorized such a government as we have had,
or has been powerless to prevent it. In either case, it is unfit to
exist.
FOOTNOTES:
[a] See _No Treason_, No. 2, pages 5 and 6.
[b] Suppose it be "the best government on earth," does that prove its
own goodness, or only the badness of all other governments?
[c] The very men who drafted it, never signed it in any way to bind
themselves by it, _as a contract_. And not one of them probably ever
would have signed it in any way to bind himself by it, _as a contract_.
[d] I have personally examined the statute books of the following
States, viz.: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois,
Wisconsin, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Kansas,
Nevada, California, and Oregon, and find that in all these States the
English statute has been re-enacted, sometimes with modifications, but
generally enlarging its operations, and is now in force.
“A man is no less a slave because he is allowed to choose a new master once in a term of years.”
What is this but
absolute, irresponsible power?
It is no answer to this view of the case to say that these men are under
oath to use their power only within certain limits; for what care they,
or what should they care, for oaths or limits, when it is expressly
provided, by the Constitution itself, that they shall never be
"questioned," or held to any responsibility whatever, for violating
their oaths, or transgressing those limits?
Neither is it any answer to this view of the case to say that the
particular individuals holding this power can be changed once in two or
six years; for the power of each set of men is absolute during the term
for which they hold it; and when they can hold it no longer, they are
succeeded only by men whose power will be equally absolute and
irresponsible.
Neither is it any answer to this view of the case to say that the men
holding this absolute, irresponsible power, must be men chosen by the
people (or portions of them) to hold it. A man is none the less a slave
because he is allowed to choose a new master once in a term of years.
Neither are a people any the less slaves because permitted periodically
to choose new masters. What makes them slaves is the fact that they now
are, and are always hereafter to be, in the hands of men whose power
over them is, and always is to be, absolute and irresponsible.[f]
The right of absolute and irresponsible dominion is the right of
property, and the right of property is the right of absolute,
irresponsible dominion. The two are identical; the one necessarily
implying the other. Neither can exist without the other. If, therefore,
Congress have that absolute and irresponsible law-making power, which
the Constitution--according to their interpretation of it--gives them,
it can only be because they own us as property. If they own us as
property, they are our masters, and their will is our law. If they do
not own us as property, they are not our masters, and their will, as
such, is of no authority over us.
But these men who claim and exercise this absolute and irresponsible
dominion over us, dare not be consistent, and claim either to be our
masters, or to own us as property.
“That no government, so called, can reasonably be trusted, or reasonably be supposed to have honest purposes in view, any longer than it depends wholly upon voluntary support”
That those who will take his money,
without his consent, in the first place, will use it for his further
robbery and enslavement, if he presumes to resist their demands in the
future. 3. That it is a perfect absurdity to suppose that any body of
men would ever take a man's money without his consent, for any such
object as they profess to take it for, viz., that of protecting him; for
why should they wish to protect him, if he does not wish them to do so?
To suppose that they would do so, is just as absurd as it would be to
suppose that they would take his money without his consent, for the
purpose of buying food or clothing for him, when he did not want it. 4.
If a man wants "protection," he is competent to make his own bargains
for it; and nobody has any occasion to rob him, in order to "protect"
him against his will. 5. That the only security men can have for their
political liberty, consists in their keeping their money in their own
pockets, until they have assurances, perfectly satisfactory to
themselves, that it will be used as they wish it to be used, for their
benefit, and not for their injury. 6. That no government, so called, can
reasonably be trusted for a moment, or reasonably be supposed to have
honest purposes in view, any longer than it depends wholly upon
voluntary support.
These facts are all so vital and so self-evident, that it cannot
reasonably be supposed that any one will voluntarily pay money to a
"government," for the purpose of securing its protection, unless he
first makes an explicit and purely voluntary contract with it for that
purpose.
It is perfectly evident, therefore, that neither such voting, nor such
payment of taxes, as actually takes place, proves anybody's consent, or
obligation, to support the Constitution. Consequently we have no
evidence at all that the Constitution is binding upon anybody, or that
anybody is under any contract or obligation whatever to support it. And
nobody is under any obligation to support it.
IV.
_The Constitution not only binds nobody now, but it never did bind
anybody._ It never bound anybody, because it was never agreed to by
anybody in such a manner as to make it, on general principles of law and
reason, binding upon him.
It is a general principle of law and reason, that a _written_ instrument
binds no one until he has signed it.
“If the jury have no right to judge of the justice of a law of the government, they plainly can do nothing to protect the people against the oppressions of the government; for there are no oppressions which the government may not authorize by law.”
It may not only prescribe who may, and who may
not, be eligible to be drawn as jurors; but it may also question each
person drawn as a juror, as to his sentiments in regard to the
particular law involved in each trial, before suffering him to be
sworn on the panel; and exclude him if he be found unfavorable to
the maintenance of such a law. [1]
So, also, if the government may dictate to the jury what laws they
are to enforce, it is no longer a " trial by the country," but a trial by
the government; because the jury then try the accused, not by any
standard of their own not by their own judgments of their rightful
liberties but by a standard. dictated to them by the government.
And the standard, thus dictated by the government, becomes the
measure of the people's liberties. If the government dictate the
standard of trial, it of course dictates the results of the trial. And
such a trial is no trial by the country, but only a trial by the
government; and in it the government determines what are its own
powers over the people, instead of the people's determining what
are their own liberties against the government. In short, if the jury
have no right to judge of the justice of a law of the government,
they plainly can do nothing to protect the people against the
oppressions of the government; for there are no oppressions which
the government may not authorize by law.
The jury are also to judge whether the laws are rightly expounded
to them by the court. Unless they judge on this point, they do
nothing to protect their liberties against the oppressions that are
capable of being practiced under cover of a corrupt exposition of
the laws. If the judiciary can authoritatively dictate to a jury any
exposition of the law, they can dictate to them the law itself, and
such laws as they please; because laws are, in practice, one thing
or another, according as they are expounded.
The jury must also judge whether there really be any such law, (be
it good or bad,) as the accused is charged with having transgressed.
Unless they judge on this point, the people are liable to have their
liberties taken from them by brute force, without any law at all.
The jury must also judge of the laws of evidence. If the
government can dictate to a jury the laws of evidence, it can not
only shut out any evidence it pleases, tending to vindicate the
accused, but it can require that any evidence whatever, that it
pleases to offer, be held as conclusive proof of any offence
whatever which the government chooses to allege.
“The only security men can have for their political liberty, consists in keeping their money in their own pockets”
That every man who puts money into the hands of a
"government" (so called), puts into its hands a sword which will be used
against himself, to extort more money from him, and also to keep him in
subjection to its arbitrary will. 2. That those who will take his money,
without his consent, in the first place, will use it for his further
robbery and enslavement, if he presumes to resist their demands in the
future. 3. That it is a perfect absurdity to suppose that any body of
men would ever take a man's money without his consent, for any such
object as they profess to take it for, viz., that of protecting him; for
why should they wish to protect him, if he does not wish them to do so?
To suppose that they would do so, is just as absurd as it would be to
suppose that they would take his money without his consent, for the
purpose of buying food or clothing for him, when he did not want it. 4.
If a man wants "protection," he is competent to make his own bargains
for it; and nobody has any occasion to rob him, in order to "protect"
him against his will. 5. That the only security men can have for their
political liberty, consists in their keeping their money in their own
pockets, until they have assurances, perfectly satisfactory to
themselves, that it will be used as they wish it to be used, for their
benefit, and not for their injury. 6. That no government, so called, can
reasonably be trusted for a moment, or reasonably be supposed to have
honest purposes in view, any longer than it depends wholly upon
voluntary support.
These facts are all so vital and so self-evident, that it cannot
reasonably be supposed that any one will voluntarily pay money to a
"government," for the purpose of securing its protection, unless he
first makes an explicit and purely voluntary contract with it for that
purpose.
It is perfectly evident, therefore, that neither such voting, nor such
payment of taxes, as actually takes place, proves anybody's consent, or
obligation, to support the Constitution. Consequently we have no
evidence at all that the Constitution is binding upon anybody, or that
anybody is under any contract or obligation whatever to support it.
And yet we have what purports, or professes, or is claimed, to be a contract—the Constitution—made eighty years ago, by men who are now all dead, and who never had any power to bind us, but which (it is claimed) has nevertheless bound three generations of men, consisting of many millions, and which (it is claimed) will be binding upon all the millions that are to come; but which nobody ever signed, sealed, delivered, witnessed, or acknowledged; and which few persons, compared with the whole number that are claimed to be bound by it, have ever read, or even seen, or ever will read, or see.
If they buy even
a small bill of goods, paying for it at the time of delivery, they take
a receipted bill for it. If they pay a small balance of a book account,
or any other small debt previously contracted, they take a written
receipt for it.
Furthermore, the law everywhere (probably) in our country, as well as in
England, requires that a large class of contracts, such as wills, deeds,
etc., shall not only be written and signed, but also sealed, witnessed,
and acknowledged. And in the case of married women conveying their
rights in real estate, the law, in many States, requires that the women
shall be examined separate and apart from their husbands, and declare
that they sign their contracts free of any fear or compulsion of their
husbands.
Such are some of the precautions which the laws require, and which
individuals--from motives of common prudence, even in cases not required
by law--take, to put their contracts in writing, and have them signed,
and, to guard against all uncertainties and controversies in regard to
their meaning and validity. And yet we have what purports, or professes,
or is claimed, to be a contract--the Constitution--made eighty years
ago, by men who are now all dead, and who never had any power to bind
_us_, but which (it is claimed) has nevertheless bound three generations
of men, consisting of many millions, and which (it is claimed) will be
binding upon all the millions that are to come; but which nobody ever
signed, sealed, delivered, witnessed, or acknowledged; and which few
persons, compared with the whole number that are claimed to be bound by
it, have ever read, or even seen, or ever will read, or see. And of
those who ever have read it, or ever will read it, scarcely any two,
perhaps no two, have ever agreed, or ever will agree, as to what it
means.
Moreover, this supposed contract, which would not be received in any
court of justice sitting under its authority, if offered to prove a debt
of five dollars, owing by one man to another, is one by which--_as it is
generally interpreted by those who pretend to administer it_--all men,
women and children throughout the country, and through all time,
surrender not only all their property, but also their liberties, and
even lives, into the hands of men who by this supposed contract, are
expressly made wholly irresponsible for their disposal of them. And we
are so insane, or so wicked, as to destroy property and lives without
limit, in fighting to compel men to fulfill a supposed contract, which,
inasmuch as it has never been signed by anybody, is, on general
principles of law and reason--such principles as we are all governed by
in regard to other contracts--the merest waste paper, binding upon
nobody, fit only to be thrown into the fire; or, if preserved, preserved
only to serve as a witness and a warning of the folly and wickedness of
mankind.
If there be such a principle as justice, or natural law, it is the principle, or law, that tells us what rights were given to every human being at his birth; what rights are, therefore, inherent in him as a human being, necessarily remain with him during life; and, however capable of being trampled upon, are incapable of being blotted out, extinguished, annihilated, or separated or eliminated from his nature as a human being, or deprived of their inherent authority or obligation.
If any mans money can be taken by a so-called government, without his own personal consent, all his other rights are taken with it; for with his money the government can, and will, hire soldiers to stand over him, compel him to submit to its arbitrary will, and kill him if he resists.
No man can rightfully be required to join, or support, an association whose protection he does not desire.
The only idea they have ever manifested as to what is a government of consent, is this--that it is one to which everybody must consent, or be shot.
A mans natural rights are his own, against the whole world; and any infringement of them is equally a crime; whether committed by one man, or by millions; whether committed by one man, calling himself a robber, or by millions calling themselves a government.
If taxation without consent is not robbery, then any band of robbers have only to declare themselves a government, and all their robberies are legalized.
The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man: Your money, or your life...The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring upon him from the road side and, holding a pistol to his head, proceed to rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful. The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber...Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you as you wish him to do. He does not persist in following you on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful sovereign, on account of the protection he affords you.
Those who are capable of tyranny are capable of perjury to sustain it.
If the jury have no right to judge of the justice of a law of the government, they plainly can do nothing to protect the people against the oppressions of the government; for there are no oppressions which the government may not authorize by law.
Martyrdom is evidence only of a mans honesty - it is no evidence that he is not mistaken. Men have suffered martyrdom for all sorts of opinions in politics and in religion yet they could not therefore have all been in the right although they could give no stronger evidence that they believed themselves in the right.
Legally speaking, the term public rights is as vague and indefinite as are the terms public health, public good, public welfare, and the like. It has no legal meaning, except when used to describe the separate, private, individual rights of a greater or less number of individuals.
That no government, so called, can reasonably be trusted, or reasonably be supposed to have honest purposes in view, any longer than it depends wholly upon voluntary support.
The only security men can have for their political liberty, consists in keeping their money in their own pockets.
A traitor is a betrayer - one who practices injury, while professing friendship. Benedict Arnold was a traitor, solely because, while professing friendship for the American cause, he attempted to injure it. An open enemy, however criminal in other respects, is no traitor.
