“Religion is the dream of the human mind. But even in dreams we do not find ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, but on earth, in the realm of reality; we only see real things in the entrancing splendor of imagination and caprice, instead of in the simple daylight of reality and necessity.”
of the Word of God,--at least in those
definitions which are not negative in the sense above alluded to,--only
defines or makes objective the true nature of the human word. The
reproach that according to my book religion is an absurdity, a nullity,
a pure illusion, would be well founded only if, according to it, that
into which I resolve religion, which I prove to be its true object and
substance, namely, man,--anthropology, were an absurdity, a nullity,
a pure illusion. But so far from giving a trivial or even a subordinate
significance to anthropology,--a significance which is assigned to
it only just so long as a theology stands above it and in opposition
to it,--I, on the contrary, while reducing theology to anthropology,
exalt anthropology into theology, very much as Christianity, while
lowering God into man, made man into God; though, it is true, this
human God was by a further process made a transcendental, imaginary
God, remote from man. Hence it is obvious that I do not take the word
anthropology in the sense of the Hegelian or of any other philosophy,
but in an infinitely higher and more general sense.
Religion is the dream of the human mind. But even in dreams we do not
find ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, but on earth, in the realm
of reality; we only see real things in the entrancing splendour of
imagination and caprice, instead of in the simple daylight of reality
and necessity. Hence I do nothing more to religion--and to speculative
philosophy and theology also--than to open its eyes, or rather to turn
its gaze from the internal towards the external, i.e., I change the
object as it is in the imagination into the object as it is in reality.
But certainly for the present age, which prefers the sign to the thing
signified, the copy to the original, fancy to reality, the appearance
to the essence, this change, inasmuch as it does away with illusion,
is an absolute annihilation, or at least a reckless profanation;
for in these days illusion only is sacred, truth profane. Nay,
sacredness is held to be enhanced in proportion as truth decreases
and illusion increases, so that the highest degree of illusion comes
to be the highest degree of sacredness. Religion has disappeared, and
for it has been substituted, even among Protestants, the appearance
of religion--the Church--in order at least that "the faith" may
be imparted to the ignorant and indiscriminating multitude; that
faith being still the Christian, because the Christian churches
stand now as they did a thousand years ago, and now, as formerly,
the external signs of the faith are in vogue.
“If therefore my work is negative, irreligious, atheistic, let it be remembered that atheism at least in the sense of this work is the secret of religion itself; that religion itself, not indeed on the surface, but fundamentally, not in intention or a”
Speculation makes religion say only what it has itself thought,
and expressed far better than religion; it assigns a meaning to
religion without any reference to the actual meaning of religion; it
does not look beyond itself. I, on the contrary, let religion itself
speak; I constitute myself only its listener and interpreter, not its
prompter. Not to invent, but to discover, "to unveil existence," has
been my sole object; to see correctly, my sole endeavour. It is not I,
but religion that worships man, although religion, or rather theology,
denies this; it is not I, an insignificant individual, but religion
itself that says: God is man, man is God; it is not I, but religion
that denies the God who is not man, but only an ens rationis,--since it
makes God become man, and then constitutes this God, not distinguished
from man, having a human form, human feelings, and human thoughts,
the object of its worship and veneration. I have only found the key to
the cipher of the Christian religion, only extricated its true meaning
from the web of contradictions and delusions called theology;--but
in doing so I have certainly committed a sacrilege. If therefore
my work is negative, irreligious, atheistic, let it be remembered
that atheism--at least in the sense of this work--is the secret of
religion itself; that religion itself, not indeed on the surface, but
fundamentally, not in intention or according to its own supposition,
but in its heart, in its essence, believes in nothing else than
the truth and divinity of human nature. Or let it be proved that the
historical as well as the rational arguments of my work are false; let
them be refuted--not, however, I entreat, by judicial denunciations,
or theological jeremiads, by the trite phrases of speculation, or
other pitiful expedients for which I have no name, but by reasons,
and such reasons as I have not already thoroughly answered.
Certainly, my work is negative, destructive; but, be it observed,
only in relation to the unhuman, not to the human elements of
religion. It is therefore divided into two parts, of which the
first is, as to its main idea, positive, the second, including the
Appendix, not wholly, but in the main, negative; in both, however,
the same positions are proved, only in a different or rather opposite
manner. The first exhibits religion in its essence, its truth, the
second exhibits it in its contradictions; the first is development,
the second polemic; thus the one is, according to the nature of the
case, calmer, the other more vehement.
“I have always taken as the standard of the mode of teaching and writing, not the abstract, particular, professional philosopher, but universal man, that I have regarded man as the criterion of truth, and not this or that founder of a system, and have from the first placed the highest excellence of the philosopher in this, that he abstains, both as a man and as an author, from the ostentation of philosophy, i.e., that he is a philosopher only in reality, not formally, that he is a quiet philosopher, not a loud and still less a brawling one.”
As regards my relation to Strauss
and Bruno Bauer, in company with whom I am constantly named, I
merely point out here that the distinction between our works is
sufficiently indicated by the distinction between their objects,
which is implied even in the title-page. Bauer takes for the object
of his criticism the evangelical history, i.e., biblical Christianity,
or rather biblical theology; Strauss, the System of Christian Doctrine
and the Life of Jesus (which may also be included under the title of
Christian Doctrine), i.e., dogmatic Christianity, or rather dogmatic
theology; I, Christianity in general, i.e., the Christian religion,
and consequently only Christian philosophy or theology. Hence I take
my citations chiefly from men in whom Christianity was not merely a
theory or a dogma, not merely theology, but religion. My principal
theme is Christianity, is Religion, as it is the immediate object,
the immediate nature, of man. Erudition and philosophy are to me only
the means by which I bring to light the treasure hid in man.
I must further mention that the circulation which my work has had
amongst the public at large was neither desired nor expected by
me. It is true that I have always taken as the standard of the mode
of teaching and writing, not the abstract, particular, professional
philosopher, but universal man, that I have regarded man as the
criterion of truth, and not this or that founder of a system, and
have from the first placed the highest excellence of the philosopher
in this, that he abstains, both as a man and as an author, from the
ostentation of philosophy, i.e., that he is a philosopher only in
reality, not formally, that he is a quiet philosopher, not a loud
and still less a brawling one. Hence, in all my works, as well as
in the present one, I have made the utmost clearness, simplicity,
and definiteness a law to myself, so that they may be understood,
at least in the main, by every cultivated and thinking man. But
notwithstanding this, my work can be appreciated and fully understood
only by the scholar, that is to say, by the scholar who loves truth,
who is capable of forming a judgment, who is above the notions
and prejudices of the learned and unlearned vulgar; for although a
thoroughly independent production, it has yet its necessary logical
basis in history. I very frequently refer to this or that historical
phenomenon without expressly designating it, thinking this superfluous;
and such references can be understood by the scholar alone. Thus,
for example, in the very first chapter, where I develop the necessary
consequences of the standpoint of Feeling, I allude to Jacobi and
Schleiermacher; in the second chapter I allude chiefly to Kantism,
Scepticism, Theism, Materialism and Pantheism; in the chapter on the
"Standpoint of Religion," where I discuss the contradictions between
the religious or theological and the physical or natural-philosophical
view of Nature, I refer to philosophy in the age of orthodoxy, and
especially to the philosophy of Descartes and Leibnitz, in which
this contradiction presents itself in a peculiarly characteristic
manner.
I would rather be a devil in alliance with truth, than an angel in alliance with falsehood.
Thomas à K. (de Imit. l. i. c. 23). "Contra
salutem proprium cogites nihil. Minus dixi: contra,
præter dixisse debueram."--Bernhardus (de Consid. ad Eugenium
Pontif. Max. l. ii.). "Qui Deum quærit, de propria salute sollicitus
est."--Clemens Alex. (Cohort. ad Gent.).
[151] Here and in other parts of this work, theory is taken in the
sense in which it is the source of true objective activity,--the
science which gives birth to art,--for man can do only so much as he
knows: "tantum potest quantum scit."
[152] Concerning the biblical conceptions of Satan, his power and
works, see Lützelberger's "Grundzüge der Paulinischen Glaubenslehre,"
and G. Ch. Knapp's "Vorles. über d. Christl. Glaubensl.," § 62-65. To
this subject belongs demoniacal possession, which also has its
attestation in the Bible. See Knapp (§ 65, iii. 2, 3).
[153] Doubtless, this unveiling of the mystery of predestination
will be pronounced atrocious, impious, diabolical. I have nothing to
allege against this; I would rather be a devil in alliance with truth,
than an angel in alliance with falsehood.
[154] A kindred doctrine is that of the Concursus Dei, according to
which, God not only gives the first impulse, but also co-operates in
the agency of the second cause. For the rest, this doctrine is only a
particular form of the contradictory dualism between God and Nature,
which runs through the history of Christianity. On the subject of
this remark, as of the whole paragraph, see Strauss: Die Christliche
Glaubenslehre, B. ii. § 75, 76.
[155] "Dum sumus in hoc corpore, peregrinamur ab eo qui summe
est."--Bernard. Epist. 18 (ed. Basle, 1552). "As long as we live, we
are in the midst of death."--Luther (Th. i. p. 331). The idea of the
future life is therefore nothing else than the idea of true, perfected
religion, freed from the limits and obstructions of this life,--the
future life, as has been already said, nothing but the true opinion
and disposition, the open heart, of religion. Here we believe--there
we behold; i.e., there there is nothing besides God, and thus nothing
between God and the soul; but only for this reason, that there ought
to be nothing between them, because the immediate union of God and the
soul is the true opinion and desire of religion.
If therefore my work is negative, irreligious, atheistic, let it be remembered that atheism — at least in the sense of this work — is the secret of religion itself; that religion itself, not indeed on the surface, but fundamentally, not in intention or according to its own supposition, but in its heart, in its essence, believes in nothing else than the truth and divinity of human nature.
Speculation makes religion say only what it has itself thought,
and expressed far better than religion; it assigns a meaning to
religion without any reference to the actual meaning of religion; it
does not look beyond itself. I, on the contrary, let religion itself
speak; I constitute myself only its listener and interpreter, not its
prompter. Not to invent, but to discover, "to unveil existence," has
been my sole object; to see correctly, my sole endeavour. It is not I,
but religion that worships man, although religion, or rather theology,
denies this; it is not I, an insignificant individual, but religion
itself that says: God is man, man is God; it is not I, but religion
that denies the God who is not man, but only an ens rationis,--since it
makes God become man, and then constitutes this God, not distinguished
from man, having a human form, human feelings, and human thoughts,
the object of its worship and veneration. I have only found the key to
the cipher of the Christian religion, only extricated its true meaning
from the web of contradictions and delusions called theology;--but
in doing so I have certainly committed a sacrilege. If therefore
my work is negative, irreligious, atheistic, let it be remembered
that atheism--at least in the sense of this work--is the secret of
religion itself; that religion itself, not indeed on the surface, but
fundamentally, not in intention or according to its own supposition,
but in its heart, in its essence, believes in nothing else than
the truth and divinity of human nature. Or let it be proved that the
historical as well as the rational arguments of my work are false; let
them be refuted--not, however, I entreat, by judicial denunciations,
or theological jeremiads, by the trite phrases of speculation, or
other pitiful expedients for which I have no name, but by reasons,
and such reasons as I have not already thoroughly answered.
Certainly, my work is negative, destructive; but, be it observed,
only in relation to the unhuman, not to the human elements of
religion. It is therefore divided into two parts, of which the
first is, as to its main idea, positive, the second, including the
Appendix, not wholly, but in the main, negative; in both, however,
the same positions are proved, only in a different or rather opposite
manner. The first exhibits religion in its essence, its truth, the
second exhibits it in its contradictions; the first is development,
the second polemic; thus the one is, according to the nature of the
case, calmer, the other more vehement.
“The present age ... prefers the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the original, fancy to reality, the appearance to the essence ... for in these days illusion only is sacred, truth profane.”
“My only wish is
to transform friends of God into friends of man, believers into thinkers, devotees of prayer into devotees of work, candidates for the hereafter into students of the world, Christians who, by their own procession and admission, are half animal, half angel into persons, into whole persons.”
“The first and highest law must be the love of man to man. Homo homini Deus est- this is the supreme practical maxim, this the turning point of the worlds History.”
To theology, ... only what it holds sacred is true, whereas to philosophy, only what holds true is sacred.
Christianity set itself the goal of fulfilling man’s unattainable desires, but for that very reason ignored his attainable desires. By promising man eternal life, it deprived him of temporal life, by teaching him to trust in God’s help it took away his trust in his own powers; by giving him faith in a better life in heaven, it destroyed his faith in a better life on earth and his striving to attain such a life. Christianity gave man what his imagination desires, but for that very reason failed to give him what he really and truly desires.
Faith does not limit itself by the idea of a world, a universe, a necessity.
Faith in the power of prayer … is … faith in miraculous power; and faith in miracles is … the essence of faith in general. … [F]aith is nothing else than confidence in the reality of the subjective in opposition to the limitations or laws of Nature and reason, … The specific object of faith, therefore, is miracle; … To faith nothing is impossible, and miracle only gives actuality to this omnipotence of faith[.]
The power of thought is the light of knowledge, the power of will is the energy of character, the power of heart is love. Reason, love and power of will are perfections of man.
The task of the modern era was the realization and humanization of God – the transformation and dissolution of theology into anthropology.
As we expand our knowledge of good books, we shrink the circle of men whose company we appreciate.
[T]he present age, which prefers the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the original[.]
In reality, where everything passes on naturally, the copy follows the original, the image the thing which it represents, the thought its object, but on the supernatural, miraculous ground of theology, the original follows the copy, the thing its own likeness.it is strange says St. Augustine, But nevertheless true, that this world could not exist if it was not known to God. That means the world is known and thought before it exists; nay it exists only because it was thought of. The existence is a consequence of the knowledge or of the act of thinking, the original a consequence of the copy, the object a consequence of its likeness.
[L]et it be remembered that atheism … is the secret of religion … ; religion … in its heart, in its essence, believes in nothing else than the truth and divinity of human nature.
I do not regard the limits of the past and present as the limits of humanity of the future
