Quotes by Janis Karpinski

“was told by Colonel Warren, the JAG officer for General Sanchez, that they werent assigned to me, that they were not under my control, and I really had no right to see them.”

“[Karpinski tried to get information, but] nobody knew anything, nobody - at least, thats what they were claiming. The Company Commander, Captain Reese, was tearful in my office and repeatedly told me he knew nothing about it, knew nothing about it, ... Captain Reese said that not only did he know about it, but he was told not to report it to his chain of command, and he was told that by Colonel Pappas. And he claimed that he saw General Sanchez out there on several occasions witnessing the torture of some of the security detainees.”

“[The first time Karpinski got any clarification about the photographs was January 23, 2004. The criminal investigator, Colonel Marcelo, came into Karpinskis office and showed her the pictures.] When I saw the pictures I was floored, ... Really, the world was spinning out of control when I saw those pictures, because it was so far beyond and outside of what I imagined. I thought that maybe some soldiers had taken some pictures of prisoners behind barbed wire or in their cell or something like that. I couldnt imagine anything like what I saw in those photographs.”

“[Marcelo told her,] Maam, Im supposed to tell you after you see the photographs that General Sanchez wants to see you in his office. ... before I even saw the photographs, I was preparing words to say in a press conference - to be up front, to be honest about this, that an investigation is ongoing and there are some allegations of detainee abuse.”

“Were never going to know the truth until they do an independent commission or look into this independently, ... This is about instructions delivered with full authority and knowledge of the Secretary of Defense and probably Cheney. I dont know if the President was involved or not. I dont care. All I know is, those instructions were communicated from the Secretary of Defenses office, from the Pentagon, through Cambone, through Miller, to Abu Ghraib.”

“The most pronounced difference was when Miller came to visit. He came right after Rumsfelds visit ... And he said that he was going to use a template from Guantánamo Bay to Gitm-oize the operations out at Abu Ghraib.”

“There was no coordination with me or Colonel Pappas. There was no discussion about chain of command.”

“You take a request down - literally, you take a request to the Finance Office. If the Pay Officer recognized your face and you were asking for $450,000 to pay a contractor for work, they would pay you in cash: $450,000. Out of control.”

“Iraq was a huge country, and when you have people largely saying now, He may have been a dictator, but we were better under Saddam, this Administration needs to take notice. And at some point you have to say, Stop the train, because its completely derailed. How do we fix it? But in an effort to do that, you have to admit that you made a few mistakes, and this Administration is not willing to admit any mistakes whatsoever.”

“Certainly I would be concerned but I would be equally concerned... that the pictures had not been released and you allow then any opposition to say but there is more.”

In November, they transferred control of Abu Ghraib to the military intelligence command completely; it was, after all, the center for interrogations for Iraq.

The day after the prison was transferred to the military intelligence command, they had an entire battalion - 1,200, 1,500 soldiers - arrive at Abu Ghraib just for force protection alone.

Military intelligence interrogators, however, their goal is to get information, to save lives, to stop the war, to find Saddam - whatever the information is going to be used for, at whatever cost.

There was a military police brigade with over 3,400 soldiers getting ready to go home because their mission - prisoner-of-war operations - was finished.