Quotes by Bob Woodward

...Obama said, I welcome debate among my team, but I wont tolerate division.

Im done doing this! Obama said, finally erupting. Weve all agreed on a plan. And were all going to stick to that plan. I havent agreed to anything beyond that.The 30,000 was a hard cap, he said forcefully. I dont want enablers to be used as wiggle room. The easy thing for me to do - politically - would actually be to say no to the 30,000. Then he gestured out the Oval Office windows, across the Potomac, in the direction of the Pentagon. Referring to Gates and the uniformed military, he said. They think its the opposite. Id be perfectly happy - He stopped mid-sentence. Nothing would make Rahm happier than if I said no to the 30,000.There was some subdued laughter.Rahm would tell me itd be much easier to do what I want to do by saying no, the president said. He could then focus on the domestic agenda that he wanted to be the heart of his presidency. The military did not understand. Politically, what these guys dont get is itd be a lot easier for me to go out and give a speech saying, You know what? The American people are sick of this war, and were going to get out of there.

Obama had campaigned against Bushs ideas and approaches. But, Donilon, for one, thought that Obama had perhaps underestimated the extent to which he had inherited George W. Bushs presidency - the apparatus, personnel and mind-set of war making.

During an hour-long conversation mid-flight, he laid out his theory of the war. First, Jones said, the United States could not lose the war or be seen as losing the war.If were not successful here, Jones said, youll have a staging base for global terrorism all over the world. People will say the terrorists won. And youll see expressions of these kinds of things in Africa, South America, you name it. Any developing country is going to say, this is the way we beat [the United States], and were going to have a bigger problem. A setback or loss for the United States would be a tremendous boost for jihadist extremists, fundamentalists all over the world and provide a global infusion of morale and energy, and these people dont need much.Jones went on, using the kind of rhetoric that Obama had shied away from, Its certainly a clash of civilizations. Its a clash of religions. Its a clash of almost concepts of how to live. The conflict is that deep, he said. So I think if you dont succeed in Afghanistan, you will be fighting in more places.Second, if we dont succeed here, organizations like NATO, by association the European Union, and the United Nations might be relegated to the dustbin of history.Third, I say, be careful you dont over-Americanize the war. I know that were going to do a large part of it, but it was essential to get active, increased participation by the other 41 nations, get their buy-in and make them feel they have ownership in the outcome.Fourth, he said that there had been way too much emphasis on the military, almost an overmilitarization of the war. The key to leaving a somewhat stable Afghanistan in a reasonable time frame was improving governance and the rule of law, in order to reduce corruption. There also needed to be economic development and more participation by the Afghan security forces.It sounded like a good case, but I wondered if everyone on the American side had the same understanding of our goals. What was meant by victory? For that matter, what constituted not losing? And when might that happen? Could there be a deadline?

Almost everything about Afghanistan was troubling Mullen. As Obama was giving intense focus on the war, Mullen was feeling more personal responsibility. Afghanistan had been marked by incredible neglect, he told some of his officers. Its almost like youre on a hunger strike and youre on the 50th day, and all of a sudden youre going to try to feed this person. Well, theyre not going to eat very quickly. I mean, every organ in the body is collapsing. The under-resourcing of Afghanistan was much deeper and wider than even I thought. It wasnt just about troops. It was intellectually, it was strategically, it was physically, culturally.

McChrystal had organized a jaw-dropping counterterrorism campaign inside Iraq, but the tactical successes did not translate into a strategic victory. This was why counterinsurgency - blanketing the population in safety and winning them over - was necessary.

Finally, the president added, The American people are idealists, but they also want their leaders to be realistic...

I think journalism gets measured by the quality of information it presents, not the drama or the pyretechnics associated with us

There are people who take rumors and embellish them in a way that can be devastating. And this pollution has to be eradicated by people in our business as best we can.

Nixons grand mistake was his failure to understand that Americans are forgiving, and if he had admitted error early and apologized to the country, he would have escaped.

The failure of the system to deal quickly was attributable to Nixons lying, stonewalling and refusal to come clean. So it took 26 months for the final truth to be known.

I believe theres too little patience and context to many of the investigations I read or see on television.

Deep Throats information, and in my view, courage, allowed the newspaper to use what he knew and suspected.

Watergate provides a model case study of the interaction and powers of each of the branches of government. It also is a morality play with a sad and dramatic ending.

Many people have their reputations as reporters and analysts because they are on television, batting around conventional wisdom. A lot of these people have never reported a story.