Because there are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another which appreciates what others comprehend; and a third which neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless.
” In both words the
underlying idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu”
were possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included
individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or
“clans” would be most appropriate.
CHAPTER XXII.
CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES
The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they
are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the
first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is
by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and
faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to
recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are
otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error
which he made was in choosing them.
There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of
Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to
be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there
are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;
another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which
neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first
is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless.
Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the
first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know
good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have
the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his
servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the
servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.
But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one
test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his
own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in
everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you
ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in
his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince,
and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not
concerned.
On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study
him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with
him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he
cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more,
many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him
dread chances.
A prudent man should always follow in the path trodden by great men and imitate those who are most excellent, so that if he does not attain to their greatness, at any rate he will get some tinge of it.
But when cities or
provinces have been accustomed to live under a prince, and the family
of that prince is extinguished, being on the one hand used to obey, and
on the other not having their old prince, they cannot unite in choosing
one from among themselves, and they do not know how to live in freedom,
so that they are slower to take arms, and a prince can win them over
with greater facility and establish himself securely. But in republics
there is greater life, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance;
they do not and cannot cast aside the memory of their ancient liberty,
so that the surest way is either to destroy them or reside in them.
CHAPTER VI
OF NEW DOMINIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND POWERS
Let no one marvel if in speaking of new dominions both as to prince
and state, I bring forward very exalted instances, for as men walk
almost always in the paths trodden by others, proceeding in their
actions by imitation, and not being always able to follow others
exactly, nor attain to the excellence of those they imitate, a prudent
man should always follow in the path trodden by great men and imitate
those who are most excellent, so that if he does not attain to their
greatness, at any rate he will get some tinge of it. He will do like
prudent archers, who when the place they wish to hit is too far off,
knowing how far their bow will carry, aim at a spot much higher than
the one they wish to hit, not in order to reach this height with
their arrow, but by help of this high aim to hit the spot they wish
to. I say then that in new dominions, where there is a new prince,
it is more or less easy to hold them according to the greater or
lesser ability of him who acquires them. And as the fact of a private
individual becoming a prince presupposes either great ability or good
fortune, it would appear that either of these things would mitigate
in part many difficulties. Nevertheless those who have been wanting
as regards good fortune have maintained themselves best. The matter
is also facilitated by the prince being obliged to reside personally
in his territory, having no others. But to come to those who have
become princes through their own merits and not by fortune, I regard
as the greatest, Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like.
Men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
He
who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost
caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested
from him with the greatest difficulty.
The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,
which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do
this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A
prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense
he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority
only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them
to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and
scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being
uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not
to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have
been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not
costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as
has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one
has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,
because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious
ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man
ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much
more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state,
so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are
exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting
of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and
all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their
own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such
guards are as useless as a colony is useful.
Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful
neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care
that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a
footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be
introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of
ambition or through fear, as one has seen already.
Is it better to be loved or feared?
This liberality is very necessary to a prince who marches with
his armies, and lives by plunder, sacking and extorting, and is dealing
with the wealth of others, for without it he would not be followed
by his soldiers. And you may be very generous indeed with what is
not the property of yourself or your subjects, as were Cyrus, Cæsar,
and Alexander; for spending the wealth of others will not diminish
your reputation, but increase it, only spending your own resources
will injure you. There is nothing which destroys itself so much as
liberality, for by using it you lose the power of using it, and become
either poor and despicable, or, to escape poverty, rapacious and hated.
And of all things that a prince must guard against, the most important
are being despicable or hated, and liberality will lead you to one or
other of these conditions. It is, therefore, wiser to have the name
of a miser, which produces disgrace without hatred, than to incur of
necessity the name of being rapacious, which produces both disgrace and
hatred.
CHAPTER XVII
OF CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED OR FEARED
Proceeding to the other qualities before named, I say that every prince
must desire to be considered merciful and not cruel. He must, however,
take care not to misuse this mercifulness. Cesare Borgia was considered
cruel, but his cruelty had settled the Romagna, united it, and brought
it peace and confidence. If this is considered a benefit, it will be
seen that he was really much more merciful than the Florentine people,
who, to avoid the name of cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be destroyed. A
prince, therefore, must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for
the purpose of keeping his subjects united and confident; for, with a
very few examples, he will be more merciful than those who, from excess
of tenderness, allow disorders to arise, from whence spring murders
and rapine; for these as a rule injure the whole community, while the
executions carried out by the prince injure only one individual. And of
all princes, it is impossible for a new prince to escape the name of
cruel, new states being always full of dangers.
God is not willing to do everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory which belongs to us.
This will not be
difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the
men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet
they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the
present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier
than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours.
[1] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X.
In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII.
With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is
necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in
them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness
is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those
men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how
extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example:
the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth
water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your
greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do
everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory
which belongs to us.
And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians
have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious
house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many
campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted,
this has happened because the old order of things was not good, and
none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man
more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was
newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and dignified will
make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting
opportunities to bring such into use in every form.
Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head.
Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how
superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But
when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs
entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are
capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there
having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by
valour or fortune, that others would yield to him.
It is of the greatest important in this world that a man should know himself, and the measure of his own strength and means; and he who knows that he has not a genius for fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace.
Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with
factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs
recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended
Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly
destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than
they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the
princes of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far
distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou
hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory
of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has brought
thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist
thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering
under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to thee. And
whereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I believed that
war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou hast every
inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance will bring
thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest important in this
world that a man should know himself, and the measure of his own
strength and means; and he who knows that he has not a genius for
fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. And it will be
well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this
way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and in this
thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that what I
have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that
I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.”
After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia,
and Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending
Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his
successor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him,
and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he
was. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he
was buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to
Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the
abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa,
and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca.
And here comes in the question whether it is better to be loved rather than feared, or feared rather than loved. It might perhaps be answered that we should wish to be both; but since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.
The first method for estimating the intelligence of a ruler is to look at the men he has around him.
A prince must not have any other object nor any other thought… but war, its institutions, and its discipline; because that is the only art befitting one who commands.
Never was anything great achieved without danger.
Whosoever desires constant success must change his conduct with the times.
Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.
But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who relies entirely upon fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the other does not.
For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no ground to rest on.
I conclude therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.
For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.
From this arises the following question: whether it is better to be loved than feared, or the reverse. The answer is that one would like to be both the one and the other, but because they are difficult to combine, it is far better to be loved than feared if you cannot be both.
From this arises the question whether it is better to be loved rather than feared, or feared rather than loved. It might perhaps be answered that we should wish to be both: but since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.
Again, a Prince should show himself a patron of merit, and should honour those who excel in every art. He ought accordingly to encourage his subjects by enabling them to pursue their callings, whether mercantile, agricultural, or any other, in security, so that this man shall not be deterred from beautifying his possessions from the apprehension that they may be taken from him, or that other refrain from opening a trade through fear of taxes; and he should provide rewards for those who desire so to employ themselves, and for all who are disposed in any way to add to the greatness of his City or State.
He who wishes to be obeyed must know how to command
