“If a mans wit be wandering, let him study the mathematics.”
Some books are to be
tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested;
that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but
not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and
attention. Some books also may be read by deputy, and extracts made of
them by others; but that would be only in the less important arguments,
and the meaner sort of books, else distilled books are like common
distilled waters, flashy things. Reading maketh a full man; conference
a ready man; and writing an exact man. And therefore, if a man write
little, he had need have a great memory; if he confer little, he had
need have a present wit: and if he read little, he had need have much
cunning, to seem to know, that he doth not. Histories make men wise;
poets witty; the mathematics subtile; natural philosophy deep; moral
grave; logic and rhetoric able to contend. Abeunt studia in mores. Nay,
there is no stond or impediment in the wit, but may be wrought out
by fit studies; like as diseases of the body, may have appropriate
exercises. Bowling is good for the stone and reins; shooting for the
lungs and breast; gentle walking for the stomach; riding for the
head; and the like. So if a man's wit be wandering, let him study the
mathematics; for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away never so
little, he must begin again. If his wit be not apt to distinguish or
find differences, let him study the Schoolmen; for they are cymini
sectores. If he be not apt to beat over matters, and to call up one
thing to prove and illustrate another, let him study the lawyers'
cases. So every defect of the mind, may have a special receipt.
Of Faction
MANY have an opinion not wise, that for a prince to govern his estate,
or for a great person to govern his proceedings, according to
the respect of factions, is a principal part of policy; whereas
contrariwise, the chiefest wisdom, is either in ordering those things
which are general, and wherein men of several factions do nevertheless
agree; or in dealing with correspondence to particular persons, one
by one. But I say not that the considerations of factions, is to be
neglected. Mean men, in their rising, must adhere; but great men,
that have strength in themselves, were better to maintain themselves
indifferent, and neutral.
“I had rather believe all the fables in the legends and the Talmud and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind”
Surely princes had need, in tender
matters and ticklish times, to beware what they say; especially in these
short speeches, which fly abroad like darts, and are thought to be shot
out of their secret intentions. For as for large discourses, they are
flat things, and not so much noted.
Lastly, let princes, against all events, not be without some great
person, one or rather more, of military valor, near unto them, for the
repressing of seditions in their beginnings. For without that, there
useth to be more trepidation in court upon the first breaking out of
troubles, than were fit. And the state runneth the danger of that which
Tacitus saith; Atque is habitus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus
auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur. But let such military
persons be assured, and well reputed of, rather than factious and
popular; holding also good correspondence with the other great men in
the state; or else the remedy, is worse than the disease.
Of Atheism
I HAD rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud,
and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind. And
therefore, God never wrought miracle, to convince atheism, because
his ordinary works convince it. It is true, that a little philosophy
inclineth man's mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men's
minds about to religion. For while the mind of man looketh upon second
causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further; but
when it beholdeth the chain of them, confederate and linked together, it
must needs fly to Providence and Deity. Nay, even that school which is
most accused of atheism doth most demonstrate religion; that is, the
school of Leucippus and Democritus and Epicurus. For it is a thousand
times more credible, that four mutable elements, and one immutable fifth
essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of
infinite small portions, or seeds unplaced, should have produced this
order and beauty, without a divine marshal. The Scripture saith, The
fool hath said in his heart, there is no God; it is not said, The fool
hath thought in his heart; so as he rather saith it, by rote to himself,
as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be
persuaded of it.
“Atheism is rather in the life than in the heart of man”
For while the mind of man looketh upon second
causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further; but
when it beholdeth the chain of them, confederate and linked together, it
must needs fly to Providence and Deity. Nay, even that school which is
most accused of atheism doth most demonstrate religion; that is, the
school of Leucippus and Democritus and Epicurus. For it is a thousand
times more credible, that four mutable elements, and one immutable fifth
essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of
infinite small portions, or seeds unplaced, should have produced this
order and beauty, without a divine marshal. The Scripture saith, The
fool hath said in his heart, there is no God; it is not said, The fool
hath thought in his heart; so as he rather saith it, by rote to himself,
as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be
persuaded of it. For none deny, there is a God, but those, for whom
it maketh that there were no God. It appeareth in nothing more, that
atheism is rather in the lip, than in the heart of man, than by this;
that atheists will ever be talking of that their opinion, as if they
fainted in it, within themselves, and would be glad to be strengthened,
by the consent of others. Nay more, you shall have atheists strive to
get disciples, as it fareth with other sects. And, which is most of all,
you shall have of them, that will suffer for atheism, and not recant;
whereas if they did truly think, that there were no such thing as God,
why should they trouble themselves? Epicurus is charged, that he did
but dissemble for his credit's sake, when he affirmed there were blessed
natures, but such as enjoyed themselves, without having respect to the
government of the world. Wherein they say he did temporize; though in
secret, he thought there was no God. But certainly he is traduced; for
his words are noble and divine: Non deos vulgi negare profanum; sed
vulgi opiniones diis applicare profanum. Plato could have said no more.
And although he had the confidence, to deny the administration, he had
not the power, to deny the nature.
“Envy is ever joined with the comparing of a mans self; and where there is no comparison, no envy.”
For they cannot want work; it being impossible,
but many, in some one of those things, should surpass them. Which was
the character of Adrian the Emperor; that mortally envied poets, and
painters, and artificers, in works wherein he had a vein to excel.
Lastly, near kinsfolks, and fellows in office, and those that have been
bred together, are more apt to envy their equals, when they are raised.
For it doth upbraid unto them their own fortunes, and pointeth at them,
and cometh oftener into their remembrance, and incurreth likewise more
into the note of others; and envy ever redoubleth from speech and fame.
Cain's envy was the more vile and malignant, towards his brother Abel,
because when his sacrifice was better accepted, there was no body to
look on. Thus much for those, that are apt to envy.
Concerning those that are more or less subject to envy: First, persons
of eminent virtue, when they are advanced, are less envied. For their
fortune seemeth, but due unto them; and no man envieth the payment of a
debt, but rewards and liberality rather. Again, envy is ever joined
with the comparing of a man's self; and where there is no comparison, no
envy; and therefore kings are not envied, but by kings. Nevertheless it
is to be noted, that unworthy persons are most envied, at their first
coming in, and afterwards overcome it better; whereas contrariwise,
persons of worth and merit are most envied, when their fortune
continueth long. For by that time, though their virtue be the same, yet
it hath not the same lustre; for fresh men grow up that darken it.
Persons of noble blood, are less envied in their rising. For it seemeth
but right done to their birth. Besides, there seemeth not much added
to their fortune; and envy is as the sunbeams, that beat hotter upon a
bank, or steep rising ground, than upon a flat. And for the same reason,
those that are advanced by degrees, are less envied than those that are
advanced suddenly and per saltum.
Those that have joined with their honor great travels, cares, or perils,
are less subject to envy. For men think that they earn their honors
hardly, and pity them sometimes; and pity ever healeth envy.
“God never wrought miracles to convince atheism, because his ordinary works convince it.”
Surely princes had need, in tender
matters and ticklish times, to beware what they say; especially in these
short speeches, which fly abroad like darts, and are thought to be shot
out of their secret intentions. For as for large discourses, they are
flat things, and not so much noted.
Lastly, let princes, against all events, not be without some great
person, one or rather more, of military valor, near unto them, for the
repressing of seditions in their beginnings. For without that, there
useth to be more trepidation in court upon the first breaking out of
troubles, than were fit. And the state runneth the danger of that which
Tacitus saith; Atque is habitus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus
auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur. But let such military
persons be assured, and well reputed of, rather than factious and
popular; holding also good correspondence with the other great men in
the state; or else the remedy, is worse than the disease.
Of Atheism
I HAD rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud,
and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind. And
therefore, God never wrought miracle, to convince atheism, because
his ordinary works convince it. It is true, that a little philosophy
inclineth man's mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men's
minds about to religion. For while the mind of man looketh upon second
causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further; but
when it beholdeth the chain of them, confederate and linked together, it
must needs fly to Providence and Deity. Nay, even that school which is
most accused of atheism doth most demonstrate religion; that is, the
school of Leucippus and Democritus and Epicurus. For it is a thousand
times more credible, that four mutable elements, and one immutable fifth
essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of
infinite small portions, or seeds unplaced, should have produced this
order and beauty, without a divine marshal. The Scripture saith, The
fool hath said in his heart, there is no God; it is not said, The fool
hath thought in his heart; so as he rather saith it, by rote to himself,
as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be
persuaded of it.
“Young men are fitter to invent than to judge, fitter for execution than for counsel, and fitter for new projects than for settled business.”
If it be objected that this doth in a sort authorize usury, which
before, was in some places but permissive; the answer is, that it is
better to mitigate usury, by declaration, than to suffer it to rage, by
connivance.
Of Youth And Age
A MAN that is young in years, may be old in hours, if he have lost no
time. But that happeneth rarely. Generally, youth is like the first
cogitations, not so wise as the second. For there is a youth in
thoughts, as well as in ages. And yet the invention of young men, is
more lively than that of old; and imaginations stream into their minds
better, and, as it were, more divinely. Natures that have much heat, and
great and violent desires and perturbations, are not ripe for action,
till they have passed the meridian of their years; as it was with
Julius Caesar and Septimius Severus. Of the latter, of whom it is said,
Juventutem egit erroribus, imo furoribus, plenam. And yet he was the
ablest emperor, almost, of all the list. But reposed natures may do well
in youth. As it is seen in Augustus Caesar, Cosmus Duke of Florence,
Gaston de Foix, and others. On the other side, heat and vivacity in
age, is an excellent composition for business. Young men are fitter
to invent, than to judge; fitter for execution, than for counsel; and
fitter for new projects, than for settled business. For the experience
of age, in things that fall within the compass of it, directeth them;
but in new things, abuseth them.
The errors of young men, are the ruin of business; but the errors of
aged men, amount but to this, that more might have been done, or sooner.
Young men, in the conduct and manage of actions, embrace more than
they can hold; stir more than they can quiet; fly to the end, without
consideration of the means and degrees; pursue some few principles,
which they have chanced upon absurdly; care not to innovate, which draws
unknown inconveniences; use extreme remedies at first; and, that which
doubleth all errors, will not acknowledge or retract them; like an
unready horse, that will neither stop nor turn. Men of age object too
much, consult too long, adventure too little, repent too soon, and
seldom drive business home to the full period, but content themselves
with a mediocrity of success. Certainly it is good to compound
employments of both; for that will be good for the present, because the
virtues of either age, may correct the defects of both; and good for
succession, that young men may be learners, while men in age are actors;
and, lastly, good for extern accidents, because authority followeth old
men, and favor and popularity, youth.
“Studies serve for delight, for ornaments, and for ability.”
Timing, I
say, not only in respect of the person that should grant it, but in
respect of those, which are like to cross it. Let a man, in the choice
of his mean, rather choose the fittest mean, than the greatest mean; and
rather them that deal in certain things, than those that are general.
The reparation of a denial, is sometimes equal to the first grant; if
a man show himself neither dejected nor discontented. Iniquum petas ut
aequum feras is a good rule, where a man hath strength of favor: but
otherwise, a man were better rise in his suit; for he, that would have
ventured at first to have lost the suitor, will not in the conclusion
lose both the suitor, and his own former favor. Nothing is thought so
easy a request to a great person, as his letter; and yet, if it be not
in a good cause, it is so much out of his reputation. There are no worse
instruments, than these general contrivers of suits; for they are but a
kind of poison, and infection, to public proceedings.
Of Studies
STUDIES serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. Their chief
use for delight, is in privateness and retiring; for ornament, is in
discourse; and for ability, is in the judgment, and disposition of
business. For expert men can execute, and perhaps judge of particulars,
one by one; but the general counsels, and the plots and marshalling of
affairs, come best, from those that are learned. To spend too much time
in studies is sloth; to use them too much for ornament, is affectation;
to make judgment wholly by their rules, is the humor of a scholar. They
perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities
are like natural plants, that need proyning, by study; and studies
themselves, do give forth directions too much at large, except they be
bounded in by experience. Crafty men contemn studies, simple men admire
them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that
is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation. Read not
to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for granted; nor to
find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider.
“Natural abilities are like natural plants, that need pruning by study; and studies themselves do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by experience.”
Iniquum petas ut
aequum feras is a good rule, where a man hath strength of favor: but
otherwise, a man were better rise in his suit; for he, that would have
ventured at first to have lost the suitor, will not in the conclusion
lose both the suitor, and his own former favor. Nothing is thought so
easy a request to a great person, as his letter; and yet, if it be not
in a good cause, it is so much out of his reputation. There are no worse
instruments, than these general contrivers of suits; for they are but a
kind of poison, and infection, to public proceedings.
Of Studies
STUDIES serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. Their chief
use for delight, is in privateness and retiring; for ornament, is in
discourse; and for ability, is in the judgment, and disposition of
business. For expert men can execute, and perhaps judge of particulars,
one by one; but the general counsels, and the plots and marshalling of
affairs, come best, from those that are learned. To spend too much time
in studies is sloth; to use them too much for ornament, is affectation;
to make judgment wholly by their rules, is the humor of a scholar. They
perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities
are like natural plants, that need proyning, by study; and studies
themselves, do give forth directions too much at large, except they be
bounded in by experience. Crafty men contemn studies, simple men admire
them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that
is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation. Read not
to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for granted; nor to
find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be
tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested;
that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but
not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and
attention. Some books also may be read by deputy, and extracts made of
them by others; but that would be only in the less important arguments,
and the meaner sort of books, else distilled books are like common
distilled waters, flashy things. Reading maketh a full man; conference
a ready man; and writing an exact man. And therefore, if a man write
little, he had need have a great memory; if he confer little, he had
need have a present wit: and if he read little, he had need have much
cunning, to seem to know, that he doth not.
If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.
So hath Plato intermingled his philosophy
with theology, and Aristotle with logic; and the second school of Plato,
Proclus and the rest, with the mathematics; for these were the arts which
had a kind of primogeniture with them severally. So have the alchemists
made a philosophy out of a few experiments of the furnace; and Gilbertus
our countryman hath made a philosophy out of the observations of a
loadstone. So Cicero, when reciting the several opinions of the nature
of the soul, he found a musician that held the soul was but a harmony,
saith pleasantly, _Hic ab arte sua non recessit_, _&c._ But of these
conceits Aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely when he saith, _Qui
respiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant_.
(8) Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to assertion
without due and mature suspension of judgment. For the two ways of
contemplation are not unlike the two ways of action commonly spoken of by
the ancients: the one plain and smooth in the beginning, and in the end
impassable; the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a
while fair and even. So it is in contemplation: if a man will begin with
certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin
with doubts, he shall end in certainties.
(9) Another error is in the manner of the tradition and delivery of
knowledge, which is for the most part magistral and peremptory, and not
ingenuous and faithful; in a sort as may be soonest believed, and not
easiest examined. It is true, that in compendious treatises for practice
that form is not to be disallowed; but in the true handling of knowledge
men ought not to fall either on the one side into the vein of Velleius
the Epicurean, _Nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de revideretur_:
nor, on the other side, into Socrates, his ironical doubting of all
things; but to propound things sincerely with more or less asseveration,
as they stand in a man’s own judgment proved more or less.
(10) Other errors there are in the scope that men propound to themselves,
whereunto they bend their endeavours; for, whereas the more constant and
devote kind of professors of any science ought to propound to themselves
to make some additions to their science, they convert their labours to
aspire to certain second prizes: as to be a profound interpreter or
commentor, to be a sharp champion or defender, to be a methodical
compounder or abridger, and so the patrimony of knowledge cometh to be
sometimes improved, but seldom augmented.
Histories make men wise; poets, witty; the mathematics, subtle; natural philosophy, deep; moral, grave; logic and rhetoric, able to contend.
Crafty men contemn studies, simple men admire
them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that
is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation. Read not
to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for granted; nor to
find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be
tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested;
that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but
not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and
attention. Some books also may be read by deputy, and extracts made of
them by others; but that would be only in the less important arguments,
and the meaner sort of books, else distilled books are like common
distilled waters, flashy things. Reading maketh a full man; conference
a ready man; and writing an exact man. And therefore, if a man write
little, he had need have a great memory; if he confer little, he had
need have a present wit: and if he read little, he had need have much
cunning, to seem to know, that he doth not. Histories make men wise;
poets witty; the mathematics subtile; natural philosophy deep; moral
grave; logic and rhetoric able to contend. Abeunt studia in mores. Nay,
there is no stond or impediment in the wit, but may be wrought out
by fit studies; like as diseases of the body, may have appropriate
exercises. Bowling is good for the stone and reins; shooting for the
lungs and breast; gentle walking for the stomach; riding for the
head; and the like. So if a man's wit be wandering, let him study the
mathematics; for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away never so
little, he must begin again. If his wit be not apt to distinguish or
find differences, let him study the Schoolmen; for they are cymini
sectores. If he be not apt to beat over matters, and to call up one
thing to prove and illustrate another, let him study the lawyers'
cases. So every defect of the mind, may have a special receipt.
Of Faction
MANY have an opinion not wise, that for a prince to govern his estate,
or for a great person to govern his proceedings, according to
the respect of factions, is a principal part of policy; whereas
contrariwise, the chiefest wisdom, is either in ordering those things
which are general, and wherein men of several factions do nevertheless
agree; or in dealing with correspondence to particular persons, one
by one.
Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation; all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the minds of men. Therefore atheism did never perturb states; for it makes men wary of themselves, as looking no further: and we see the times inclined to atheism (as the time of Augustus Cæsar) were civil times. But superstition hath been the confusion of many states, and bringeth in a new primum mobile, that ravisheth all the spheres of government. The master of superstition is the people; and in all superstition wise men follow fools; and arguments are fitted to practice, in a reversed order.
Of this state hear what Cicero saith: Quam volumus licet, patres
conscripti, nos amemus, tamen nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos,
nec calliditate Poenos, nec artibus Graecos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus
gentis et terrae domestico nativoque sensu Italos ipsos et Latinos; sed
pietate, ac religione, atque hac una sapientia, quod deorum immortalium
numine omnia regi gubernarique perspeximus, omnes gentes nationesque
superavimus.
Of Superstition
IT WERE better to have no opinion of God at all, than such an opinion,
as is unworthy of him. For the one is unbelief, the other is contumely;
and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity. Plutarch saith
well to that purpose: Surely (saith he) I had rather a great deal, men
should say, there was no such man at all, as Plutarch, than that they
should say, that there was one Plutarch, that would eat his children
as soon as they were born; as the poets speak of Saturn. And as the
contumely is greater towards God, so the danger is greater towards men.
Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to
laws, to reputation; all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue,
though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and
erecteth an absolute monarchy, in the minds of men. Therefore atheism did
never perturb states; for it makes men wary of themselves, as looking
no further: and we see the times inclined to atheism (as the time
of Augustus Caesar) were civil times. But superstition hath been the
confusion of many states, and bringeth in a new primum mobile, that
ravisheth all the spheres of government. The master of superstition,
is the people; and in all superstition, wise men follow fools; and
arguments are fitted to practice, in a reversed order. It was gravely
said by some of the prelates in the Council of Trent, where the
doctrine of the Schoolmen bare great sway, that the Schoolmen were like
astronomers, which did feign eccentrics and epicycles, and such engines
of orbs, to save the phenomena; though they knew there were no such
things; and in like manner, that the Schoolmen had framed a number of
subtle and intricate axioms, and theorems, to save the practice of the
church. The causes of superstition are: pleasing and sensual rites
and ceremonies; excess of outward and pharisaical holiness; overgreat
reverence of traditions, which cannot but load the church; the
stratagems of prelates, for their own ambition and lucre; the favoring
too much of good intentions, which openeth the gate to conceits and
novelties; the taking an aim at divine matters, by human, which cannot
but breed mixture of imaginations: and, lastly, barbarous times,
especially joined with calamities and disasters. Superstition, without a
veil, is a deformed thing; for, as it addeth deformity to an ape, to be
so like a man, so the similitude of superstition to religion, makes it
the more deformed.
But it is not only the difficulty and labor which men take in finding out of truth, nor again that when it is found it imposeth upon mens thoughts, that doth bring lies in favor; but a natural though corrupt love of the lie itself.
For I doe conceive,
that the Latine Volume of them, (being in the Universall Language) may
last, as long as Bookes last. My Instauration, I dedicated to the King:
My Historie of Henry the Seventh, (which I have now also translated into
Latine) and my Portions of Naturall History, to the Prince: And these
I dedicate to your Grace; Being of the best Fruits, that by the good
Encrease, which God gives to my Pen and Labours, I could yeeld. God
leade your Grace by the Hand. Your Graces most Obliged and faithfull
Servant,
FR. ST. ALBAN
Of Truth
WHAT is truth? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer.
Certainly there be, that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to
fix a belief; affecting free-will in thinking, as well as in acting. And
though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there remain
certain discoursing wits, which are of the same veins, though there be
not so much blood in them, as was in those of the ancients. But it is
not only the difficulty and labor, which men take in finding out
of truth, nor again, that when it is found, it imposeth upon men's
thoughts, that doth bring lies in favor; but a natural, though corrupt
love, of the lie itself. One of the later school of the Grecians,
examineth the matter, and is at a stand, to think what should be in it,
that men should love lies; where neither they make for pleasure, as with
poets, nor for advantage, as with the merchant; but for the lie's sake.
But I cannot tell; this same truth, is a naked, and open day-light, that
doth not show the masks, and mummeries, and triumphs, of the world, half
so stately and daintily as candle-lights. Truth may perhaps come to the
price of a pearl, that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the
price of a diamond, or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights.
A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if
there were taken out of men's minds, vain opinions, flattering hopes,
false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would
leave the minds, of a number of men, poor shrunken things, full of
melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves?
One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy vinum daemonum,
because it fireth the imagination; and yet, it is but with the shadow of
a lie.
A wise man will make more opportunities than he finds.
Amongst a man's inferiors
one shall be sure of reverence; and therefore it is good, a little to
be familiar. He that is too much in anything, so that he giveth another
occasion of satiety, maketh himself cheap. To apply one's self to
others, is good; so it be with demonstration, that a man doth it upon
regard, and not upon facility. It is a good precept generally, in
seconding another, yet to add somewhat of one's own: as if you will
grant his opinion, let it be with some distinction; if you will follow
his motion, let it be with condition; if you allow his counsel, let it
be with alleging further reason. Men had need beware, how they be too
perfect in compliments; for be they never so sufficient otherwise, their
enviers will be sure to give them that attribute, to the disadvantage
of their greater virtues. It is loss also in business, to be too full
of respects, or to be curious, in observing times and opportunities.
Solomon saith, He that considereth the wind, shall not sow, and he
that looketh to the clouds, shall not reap. A wise man will make more
opportunities, than he finds. Men's behavior should be, like their
apparel, not too strait or point device, but free for exercise or
motion.
Of Praise
PRAISE is the reflection of virtue; but it is as the glass or body,
which giveth the reflection. If it be from the common people, it is
commonly false and naught; and rather followeth vain persons, than
virtuous. For the common people understand not many excellent virtues.
The lowest virtues draw praise from them; the middle virtues work in
them astonishment or admiration; but of the highest virtues, they
have no sense of perceiving at all. But shows, and species virtutibus
similes, serve best with them. Certainly fame is like a river, that
beareth up things light and swoln, and drowns things weighty and solid.
But if persons of quality and judgment concur, then it is (as the
Scripture saith) nomen bonum instar unguenti fragrantis. It fireth all
round about, and will not easily away. For the odors of ointments are
more durable, than those of flowers.
We are much beholden to Machiavelli and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do . For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest; that is, all forms and natures of evil. For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of evil.
(9) But to return; there belongeth further to the handling of this part,
touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or opposite,
touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession,
which hath been likewise handled; but how? rather in a satire and
cynically, than seriously and wisely; for men have rather sought by wit
to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than
with judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as
Solomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to
scorn and censure shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no
matter for his instruction: _Quærenti derisori scientiam ipsa se
abscondit_; _sed studioso fit obviam_. But the managing of this argument
with integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be
one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be
planted. For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk—that if he see you
first, you die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth—so is it with
deceits and evil arts, which, if they be first espied they leese their
life; but if they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much beholden
to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought
to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the
columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the
serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and
lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest—that is, all forms and
natures of evil. For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay,
an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them,
without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men of corrupted minds
presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and
believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and men’s exterior language. So
as, except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of
their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality. _Non recipit
stultus verba prudentiæ_, _nisi ea dixeris quæ_, _versantur in corde
ejus_.
(10) Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also appertain the
duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant.
So likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of
companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other
proportionate duties; not as they are parts of government and society,
but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons.
(11) The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it
also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the
weighing of duties between person and person, case and case, particular
and public.
Crafty men condemn studies; Simple men admire them; And wise men use them: For they teach not their own use: but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation.
Nothing is thought so
easy a request to a great person, as his letter; and yet, if it be not
in a good cause, it is so much out of his reputation. There are no worse
instruments, than these general contrivers of suits; for they are but a
kind of poison, and infection, to public proceedings.
Of Studies
STUDIES serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. Their chief
use for delight, is in privateness and retiring; for ornament, is in
discourse; and for ability, is in the judgment, and disposition of
business. For expert men can execute, and perhaps judge of particulars,
one by one; but the general counsels, and the plots and marshalling of
affairs, come best, from those that are learned. To spend too much time
in studies is sloth; to use them too much for ornament, is affectation;
to make judgment wholly by their rules, is the humor of a scholar. They
perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities
are like natural plants, that need proyning, by study; and studies
themselves, do give forth directions too much at large, except they be
bounded in by experience. Crafty men contemn studies, simple men admire
them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that
is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation. Read not
to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for granted; nor to
find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be
tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested;
that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but
not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and
attention. Some books also may be read by deputy, and extracts made of
them by others; but that would be only in the less important arguments,
and the meaner sort of books, else distilled books are like common
distilled waters, flashy things. Reading maketh a full man; conference
a ready man; and writing an exact man. And therefore, if a man write
little, he had need have a great memory; if he confer little, he had
need have a present wit: and if he read little, he had need have much
cunning, to seem to know, that he doth not. Histories make men wise;
poets witty; the mathematics subtile; natural philosophy deep; moral
grave; logic and rhetoric able to contend.
“Begin doing what you want to do now. We are not living in eternity. We have only this moment, sparkling like a star in our hand-and melting like a snowflake...”
“Write down the thoughts of the moment. Those that come unsought for are commonly the most valuable.”
“I will never be an old man. To me, old age is always 15 years older than I am.”
“Its not what we eat but what we digest that makes us strong; not what we gain but what we save that makes us rich; not what we read but what we remember that makes us learned; and not what we profess but what we practice that gives us integrity.”
“Knowledge itself is power”
